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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

EARL W. WILSO·N, doing business as
Wilson's Used Cars and HARTFORD
ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO., a
corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDU)STRIAL ~cOMMIS·SlO·N O·F
UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, wioow,
and BEVERLY BARNEY, minor,
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased,

Case No.
719'1

Defiendants.

PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF

ST~TEMENT

O·F 'T'HE CASE

This case comes before this. Honorable Court on a
Writ of Review to the Industrial ;Comrirission of Utah,
to review an Order of the commission, awarding to defendants Roberta and Beverly Barney death benefits
in the sum of $7000.00, for th·e death of Frank Barney,
deceased. 'The single question before the Court is whether
decedent's fatal injuries were sustained in an accident
arising out of, or in the course of his employment.
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In this brief, plaintiff, Earl W. Wilson, will be referred to as Wilson; plaintiff Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., will be referred to as Hartford Co., and the
defendant Industrial ·Commission of Utah will be referred to as the Commission.

At all times material to this controversy, Earl W.
Wilson was engaged in the used car selling and automobile repair business. (Tr. p. 7). He had two places
of business in Salt Lake ·City, Utah, and also had places
of business in Ogden and Magna, Utah, and Phoenix
Arizona ('T. p. 8).
For a period of about two years preceding January
9, 1947, decedent Barney had been employed intermittently by Wilson (Tr. p·. 7). Wilson's place of business in
Magna had been ''taken over" hy him a short time prior
to January 4, 1947, '(Tr. p. 2!6), and on the date last mentioned Wilson had ·engaged the services of Barney, who
was to ''take over'' the Magna ''setup and get that going." ('Tr. p. 13).
Barney was to receive $40.00 ( Tr. p. 8) or $45.00
(Tr. p. 14) per week, p~lus commissions on the sale of
cars. (Tr. p·p·. 8, 14). He was employed in the capacity
of mechanic and foreman. '('Tr. P'· 7) He didn't have any
regular hours, but ordinarily went to work about eight
o'clock. ( Tr. pp. 10, '11, 25, 28, 35) His hours varied
somewhat, depending upon the amount of business. (Tr.
pp. 13, 27)
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3
Barney sustained fatal injuries in an auton1obile
accident at about 8:15 a.m., on January 9, 1947, while
riding as a passenger in an automobile being driven by
Foote, a mechanic, who 'Yas also en1ployed by Wilson
and "~ho worked at the Magna shop. (Tr. pp. 5, 30, 32)
At the time of the accident Foote and Barney were
traveling from their respective homes in Salt Lake City
to \\Tilson's place of business in Magna. They had left
their homes about 8 :00 a.m., and the accident occurred
at about 7200 West 21st South 'Street. (Tr. p. 30) 'The
accident occurred on a Thursday, and Barney and Foote
had been working for Wilson only since the previous
Monday. (Tr. p. 31)

,

... -

-·
·'

'•

1";
I.V

During the first three days of his employment, i.e.,
during the three days immediately prior to his death,
Barney had worked at Magna every day. His chief function there was to get the shop started and operating, but
if he had time he assisted with the repair work. (Tr.
p. 15) Although up to the time of his death he had
worked only at Magna, Barney's work was connected
with Wilson's places of business in Salt Lake, Ogden,
and Phoenix as well. (Tr. pp.. 9, 10, 23, 26, 27, 29) It
appears that on the ·evening of January 8, plaintiff had
completed the job of organizing and setting up the Magna
shop, (Tr. p. 29), and that thereafter his work might
take him to any of Wilson's places of business. Wilson
testified that if Barney had not been killed on the morning of January 9, that he would have worked in ,s:alt
Lake on that afternoon, and would have worked at the
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Ogden place of business on the following day (January
lOth) (Tr. pp. 27, 2'9). He was as much foreman of the
Salt Lake shop, as of the Magna shop. (Tr. p. 27)
On January 8, the day before the fatal accident, Wilson had removed an automobile from Ogden to Magna for
repairs. CTr. p. 15) On the evening of January 8, when
Barney called at the home of Wilson, Wilson instructed
him to go out to Magna the next morning; hut whether
he instructed Barney to go out there and bring into Salt
Lake the automobile· which Wilson.had taken there from
Ogden on the preceding day, or whether he merely instructed him to go out there and complete the repairs to
be done on the automobile is uncertain. Wilson testified
that he ordered Barney to go out to Magna and bring the
truck in to Salt Lake. ( Tr. p. 9) However, he admitted
that he didn't know the status of the repairs on the car
on that morning, and he didn't know whether it was
ready to come to Salt Lake ( Tr. p. 15), and further,
that if the repair work on the automobile were not completed, Barney, or Foote under Barney's direction, would
have to complete the repairs before the car could be
brought into Salt Lake (~r. p. 16), and further admitted
that he had told Charles Welch, a Salt L·ake attorney
who investigated the accident, that he had sent Barney
out to Magna to make repairs, and that he, Wilson,
signed a written statement to that effect. (Tr. p. 17).
However, two days. before the hearing of this matter before the commission, and app·roxima.tely a year after the
occurrence, of the fatal accident, Wils-on called at the office of one of counsel for the plaintiffs and asked to
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change his "~ritten statement to the effect that he sent
Barney out to niagna on the n1orning of January ~), not
for the purpose of making repairs, but for the purpose
of bringing the automobile to Salt Lake. (Tr. pp. 18-19)
Both Foote and Barney had al,Yays furnished their
own transportation to Magna. They receive~ no allowance for travel, and th€y selected their own means and
route of transportation. Wilson had never furnished
transportation for either. (Tr . pp. 14, 20, 27, 28, 3'3, 34)
Wilson left it to the initiative and judgment of Barney,
as to how he would get the car from Magna to Salt Lake.
(Tr. p. 24:) The car was to be in Salt Lake by noon.
(Tr. p. 25)
It is adm.itt€d that Wilson was an employer coming
within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, and that the Hartford Company was his insurance
carrier, and it is undisputed that Roberta and Beverly
Barney were respectively the surviving widow and minor
daughter of Frank Barney, and that they were his dependents.
The facts above stated are substantially without dispute, except as to the question of whether on the evening of January 8, when Wilson ordered Barney to go out
to Magna on the following morning, he instructed B·arney to complete the repairs on the automobile, or whether
he merely instructed ~ to bring the automobile into
Salt Lake. As will be more fully pointed out in our
argument, hereafter, we do not regard this as of substantial importance. However, if the court should he of
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the opinion that this point of fact is crucial, we think
that the instructions given by Wilson to Barney must
be understood as tacitly and implicitly, if not expressly
and explicitly, directing Barney to complete repairs upon
the automobile before bringing it to Salt Lake. The fact
that Wilson did not know what the state of repairs on
the automobile was, the fact that Barney was to go to
~ [agna in the morning, but not deliver the car in 'Salt
Lake until noon, and the fact that Wilson's wrecker was
broken down at the time and not available for use, and
hence that the car would have to be brought to Salt
Lake on its own power, all lead irresistably to the conclusion that it was implicit, if not explicit in Wilson's
instructions to Barney, that Barney should see that repairs were completed upon the automobile ~before he
brought it to Salt Lake.

ASSIG·N·MENTS ·OF ERRO'R
Plaintiffs assign as ·error the following rulings and
orders of the commission:
1. 'The commission erred in finding that ''the deceased did sustain an injury arising out of or in the
course of his employment on the 9th day of January,
1947."

2. ·The commission erred in finding that ''the app;licants are entitled to the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act.''
3.

The commission erred in ordering the plaintiffs
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to pay for all hospital and n1edical expense iucurrPd in
connection "ith this injury.
4. The commission erred in ordering plaintiffs to
pay the statutory burial allowance of $250.00.

5. The Commission erred in making an award to
the applicants of $7000.00, or any award whatsoever.
ARGUMEN·T
As stated at the outset of this brief, the only question before this Honorable Court is· whether _the automobile accident which claimed the life of Frank Barney
was an accident arising out of or in the course ~f his
employment with Earl Wilson.
It is the general rule, now well established, both in
this jurisdiction, and in the United States generally, and
subject to few exceptions, that an injury sustained by
an employee while going to or returning from work, without restraint, does not arise out of or in the course of
his employment. This doctrine is now so well established
that a citation of authorities hardly seems necessary, but
we refer the Court to the following for illustrative purposes: Greer v. Ind. Com., 74 Ut. 379, 279 Pac. 900;
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189, 8 Pac.
(2d) 617; \Titagrap,h, Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 96 Ut. 190, 85
Pac. ( 2d) 601; London Guarantee & Ace. Co. v. Ind. Ace.
Comm., 190 Cal. 587, 213 Pac. 977; Ind. Comm. v. Anderson (Colo.), 169 Pac. 13'5, L.R.A. 1918 F. 885; Hartford
Accident & Ins. Co. v. Lodes, (Okla.), 22 Pac. ( 2d) p.
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361; Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.v. Stout, (Okla.), 65 Pac.
( 2d) 477; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Ind. Acdt.
Cotnm., ('Cal.), 37 Pac. (2d) 441, annotation in 97 A.L.R.
555, 556; and 1. Honnold on Workmen's Compensation
358, Sec. 107.
!The fundamental purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Acts is to make the cost of the human wreckage in industry a part of the cost of production, to be
borne by society as a whole, and not by the unfortunate
workmen. However, it was not the purpose of the acts,
and it was n~ver intended by the legislature, that workmen should be specially protected against hazards common to all, and having no relation to their employment.
This principle is well stated in 28 R.'C.L.. 804, Workmen's Compensation Acts, Sec. 98, where it is ·said:
"The compensation act, it has been very generally held, does not authorize an award in case
of injury or death from a peril which is common
to all mankind, or to which the public at large is
exposed. The argument seems to be that if the
worlrman were permitted to recover in such cases,
he would enjoy privileges above those of the public generally, and in effect he insured against
every sort of calamity, which is not the intention
of the statute. At home or on the street he may
meet with accident (sic) not arising out of or in
the course of his employment. 'The act does not
cover such cases. The employee gets up in the
morning, dresses hims·elf, and goes to work, because of his employment, yet if he meets with
an accident before coming to the employer's
premises or his place of work, that is not a risk
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of his occupation, but of life genernlly."
In the earlv.. davs
. of the co1npensation acts the doctrine of street accidents was developed by the courts,
and it ,vas held that a workman was not entitled to conlpensation for an injury occurring in a public street,
whether by vehicular collision, by slipping or stumbling
or otherwise. This doctrine was harsh, and it oftimes
led to denials of awards for injuries sustained by employees when they were actually required to incur the
risks of the streets in the course of their employment.
See cases annotated in L.R.A. 1916A, 314. Later on, an
exception to the rule was developed "in the case of workmen whose employment required them to be frequently
or continually on the streets such as messengers and
draymen. 28 R.C.L. 805.

The modern view, now quite generally aooepted, is
that employees injured on the streets while in prurswance
of their duties l()r of theiJr master's business, are entitled
to compensation. However, the Courts have never departed from the view that employees injured while traveling to or from their work are not entitled to compensation. The risks of the streets are in that situation risks
common to all mankind, and workmen are not a class entitled to or intended to be specially protected against
those risks which are common to all. There are some exceptions to this rule, which we shall note with more
particularity hereafter, but at present it is sufficient to
note the general rule.
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We think that the fundamental principle which must
guide this court in deciding this case is that the purpose
of the compensation act is to protect the workman from
those risks which are incident to his employment, hut
not to protect him from risks to which the public at
large is subject, or those risks voluntarily incurred by
the work1nan and having no relation to his employment.
'\rhether a risk is a special hazard incident to the Workman's employment, or a general risk to which the public
at large is exposed, must depend upon the facts of each
case. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. For example, the risks of the street are hazards to which all are
exposed. However, they may also be special hazards incident to the employment of the worker. ·This would be
especially true of cab and truck drivers, street car conductors, messengers, etc. But the hazards of the street
likewise are incident to the employment of the stenographer during the time she is carrying the daily mail
to or from the post-office. However, in the a:hsence of
special circumstances such risks are not incident to her
employment during the time she is traveling to the office in the morning, or from the office to her home at
the conclusion of her day's work.
Another reason for the general rule that worlanen
are not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained
by them while traveling to or from their place of employment is that during the time they are upon their
employer's premises or otherwise engaged in his service, they are subject to his control, hut when they are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a'vay and not in perforn1ance of their duties, tht~y are
not subject to his control. An en1ployer can substantially and effectually protect hnnself froin compensation claims for injuries to his employees on his pre1uises,
by an effectual safety program. Thus by availing himself of mechanical safety appliances, by establishing and
enforcing rigid rules of safety, by prescribing rules for
the operation of dangerous machinery, by conscientious
discovery and elimination of hazards, and by safety
educational programs among his employees, he may
substantially reduce, or even wholly eliminate accidents within his place of business. But during the time
his employees are traveling to or from his place of business he has no control over them whatsoever. If they
choose to travel over a hazardous route, or by a highly
dangerous means, that is a matter over which he has
no control. And it is a matter from which he receives no
benefit. Consequently, there is no reason in law or good
morals why he should bear that financial risk.

Having made these preliminary observations, we
shall now proceed to an analysis of the facts of this
case in light of the a:bove mentioned rules and principles.
Since it is the general rule that an employee is not
entitled to compensation for injuries sustained by him
while traveling to or from his employer's place of business, the award of the Commission in this case cannot
be permitted to stand unless the facts of this case bring
it within one of the established exceptions to the general rule; or unless the deceased Barney, for some reason
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peculiar to the facts of this case may be said to have
co1rnnenced the course of his employment at the time he
left his home rather than at the time he arrived at his
en1ployer's place of business. We shall attempt to demonstrate, during the balance of this argument, that neither
of these conditions prevailed. The two propositions are
to a large extent inextricably interwoven, but we think
that clear analysis requires that they be considered
separately, and hence we shall argue them as separate
points.
POINT I.
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE DO NOT BRING IT WITHIN
ANY OF THE RECOGNIZED EX·CEPTIONS TO THE
GENERAL RULE THAT EMPLOYEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION F'OR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THEM WHILE TRAVELING TO OR FROM
THEIR EMPLOYER'S PLACE OF BUSINESS.

One of the most comprehensive discussions of the
general rule, sometimes referred to as the plant rule, is
found in the opinion of this Court in the case of Vitagraph, Inc. v. Ind. Corum., 96 Ut. 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601.
After stating and discussing the general rule, the Court
proceeded to enumerate the exceptions to the rule.
'The first stated exception is an apparent and
not a true exception, but is really an extension of the
plant rule. This extension of the rule may be stated as
follows: JThe confines of the plant, or situs of employment extend beyond the employer's premises and include the approaches to the work, which the employees
(1)
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are required to use to come upon the e1nployer 's prentises,
"Then the facts indicate that the danger incident to sueh
use must have been in contemplation of the employer
and employee at the tin1e of employment as a danger
incident to the employment and a necessary part of the
plant establishment. This doctrine was first enunciated
in this jurisdiction in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
60 Ut. 161, 207 Pac. 148, 28 A.L.R. 1394, and "'"as followed and somewhat broadened in Bountiful Brick Co.
v. Ind. Comm., 68 Ut. 600, 251 Pac. 555. In both of those
cases there were railroad tracks immediately adjacent
to the employer's premises, and in order to come upon
the ·employer's premises, it was necessary that the employees cross the tracks, there being no other approach.
There is nothing in the facts in the case at bar to
bring it within the doctrine of the :Cudahy and Bountiful
Brick cases. There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the situs of the fatal accident was the necessary
and exclusive approach_ to Wilson's place of business in
Magna, nor are there any facts to indicate that the danger incident to passing over this portion of the road must
have been in the contemplation of the employer and employee at the time of employment as a danger incident
to the employment, and a necessary part of the plant
establishment. As a matter of fact the locus of the accident is not fixed in relation to Wilson's place of business in Magna. The record does not indicate whether
they were near together or several miles apart.
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(2) The second exception to the plant or general
rule is the special mission or special errand doctrine-, illustrated by the case of Kahn Bros. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 75
Ut. 145, 28'3 Pac. 1054. ·This was explained in the Vitagraph case in the following language:
''This exception coveTs cases where the employee has detached himself from the plant or
place of employment and is injured through exposure to the hazards general to the public, when
such exposure is brought about while in the performance of some task or duty assigned him by
the employer, and which took him to the place of
injury. The principle underlying such cases is
that being at the place of injury under the orders
of the employer and upon his business, the situs
or locus of the employment is at the point where
the employee is at any particular moment while
carrying out the mission and performing the orders of the employer. 'The employee is exposed
to the danger because the employer and his business put him there. It was not the Workman's
own whim or business that brought him into the
place of danger, but the order or business of the
employer and presupposes that the workman but
for the fact that he was at the time of injury
actually doing work for the employer would not
have been at the place of injury. This is distinguished from the situation in which the workman is injured while going to and from the plant
or place of employment becaus·e such person is
not at the time of injury engaged in doing anything for the employer.''
In the case at bar, the record is barren of any evidence that Barney was pursuing any special mission or
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even any incidental mission of his employer. So far as
the record reveals he was doing nothing Inore than ri<ling out to the Magna shop for the purpose of comn1encing his day's work.
(3) The third exception to the plant rule enumerated in the , . .itagraph case is based on the case of Morgan
v. Ind. Comm., 92 Ut. 129, 66 Pac (2d) 144. 'Ve are inclined to agree with the position taken by Mr. Justice
Wolfe in his concurring opinion in the later case of
GDodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ind. c·omm., 100 Ut. 8,
110 Pac. (2d) 334, to the effect that the Morgan case
was incorrectly decided, and ought to be overruled. However, that is a matter with which we are not here directly
concerned. The Morgan case stands upon its own peculiar
facts and if it is still good law it does- not control here
because the facts are not similar.

In that ease the applicant was the principal of Davis
High School, and was injured while walking from his
home to the school on a Sunday evening to carry out a·
special or additional duty at times imposed upon him
by the conditions of his employment in regard to the
performance of which he stood in the situation of a
superior giving orders to himself. In his regular teaching assignments the· applicant would have been operating under the plant rule, attaching himself to his work
upon arriving ·at the schoolhouse and detaching himself
upon leaving it. The basis of that decision was that the
employee was for all practical purpos·es his own superior,
directed his own movements and hours and places of
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work, and by his own direction placed himself upon the
errand and thus in the place of danger. Not so in the
case at bar. Although Barney was a foreman, and assumedly had some supervisory duties, there is nothing
in the record to show that he was his own superior or
that he had any voice in determining where· he should go.
Clearly he did not send himself to Magna. He was directed to go there by Wilson.
(4) The fourth exception noted in the Vitagraph
case is the situation where the ·employee is <!oing something incident to his employment while at his home.
Thus in Beaver City v. Ind. Comm., 67 Ut. 8, 245 Pac.
378, the city marshall of Beaver was injured while at
home · cleaning his gun, undisputedly an incident to his
employment. This is not a true exception to the plant
rule, for in this situation the employee is not traveling
to or from his place of employment at all. And it is
readily apparent that this ·exception has no relation to
the facts of the case at bar.
('5) Another exception to the plant rule, not mentioned in the Vitagraph case, but generally accepted by
the courts, and followed by this Court in the present
case of London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Frazee,
- - Ut.--, 185 Pac. (2d) 284, is where transportation
is furnished by the employer to the employee, andjor
the em:ployee is paid for time spent in traveling to and
from work. In the case at bar it is undisputed that the
employer never furnished transportation to Barney, and
left it entirely up to him as to how he should get from
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his home to work. Nor is there any ·evidence to show th~t
plaintiff was to be compensated for time sp'ent in travel.
He received a weekly wage plus commissions, regardless
of how much or little time he required to travel to and
from his work.
It is quite clear here, that the facts of this case do
not bring it within any of the recognized exceptions
to the plant or general rule ..
POINT II.
THE DECEASED FRANK BARN.EY CAN N 0T BE SAID
TO HAVE EN'TERED UPON 'THE ·OOURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME HE LEFT HIS HOME TO
GO TO MAGNA, OR AT ANY TIME BE~ORE HE ARRIVED AT THE MAGNA S.H 0P.
1

1

In attempting to argue this point we are at somewhat of a disadvantage, since we cannot anticip·ate what
contention defendants may make in this regard. We
have already pointed out that this point is rather closely
allied to the first point dis-cuss-ed. Much of what has
been heretofore stated in this brief would be equally
applicable to the point now under discussion, hut no
useful purpose could be subserved by rep·eating that
here.
We have been unable to discover a case ''on all
fours'' with the case at bar, either from. this or from
any foreign jurisdiction. However, the case of McRae
v. D·epartment of Labor and Industries of Washington,
(Wash.), 185 Wash. 343, 54 Pac. (2'd) 1017 is very similar. 'The facts in that case were that the applicant, a 19
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year old youth who was going to school, was employed
during after-school hours at a garage, of which his father was general manager. The applicant owned a motorcycle, which he rode from home to sehool and from
Bchool to work. He also used the motorcycle to run errands for the garage. He did not have any definite hours,
and the number of hours he worked per day depended
upon the amount of business at the garage. He was paid
a fixed daily wage. One afternoon he did not report for
work, having slightly injured himself a few days previously. His father, when he returned home that evening,
found the youth's condition much improved, and ordered
him to deliver a truck, which was then at the house, to
the garage, and instructed him to return home on his
motorcycle. The youth delivered the truck to the garage
as directed, and on the return trip home, sustained an
injury for which he claimed compensation. IThe Supreme
Court of Washington held that the plant rule was applicable, that applicant was merely returning home from
his work when the accident happened, and therefore, the
injury was not sustained in the course of his employment.
It will be noted that in the Washington case, as in
the case at bar, that the employee did not work regular
or fixed hours, and that in each case, he had a fixed wage
regardless of how many or few hours he worked. In the
Washington case, he was injured while returning home,
after having made delivery of a vehicle. In the case at
bar, he was injured while traveling to his employer's
place of business to pick up a vehicle to be delivered to
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another shop. The facts are substantially identical and
the same principles must control.
In searching the Utah reports we have failed to
discover a case closely similar on its facts. However, the
underlying principle has been many times reeogniz-ed
and followed by this C·ourt. Perhap~s the ca8e mos't similar
in fact. to the case at bar is Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617.

In that case one Shufelt was employed by the W algreen Co. which was in the kodak business. The employee
lived at 1258 Sherman Ave., in Salt Lake City. It was
his duty to report at his- employer's pilace of business
every morning at 8:00 a.m. However, before so reporting, it was his duty to call at the Semloh Hotel and the
Union Pacific Depot and pick up films, and bring them
to his employer's p·lant. Shufelt was killed one ·morning while he was riding his bicycle to work, when he
collided with a street car at the intersection of Eleventh
E·ast Street and She·rman Ave. He had not y·et come to
the Semloh Hotel where he was to make his first pick-up
of films. The Industrial Commission made an award of
death benefits, which award was set aside by this court.
It was held that the general rule ap·plied. The court
said:
"'The award must be, and it accordingly is,
annulled because the evidence does J_l.Ot support
the finding that Edwin's (Shufelt's} death was
caused by an accident arising out of or in the
course of his employment.''
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In Roberts v. Ind. Comm., 87 Ut. 10, 47 Pac. (2d)
1052, Roberts an employee of defendant railroad, whoresided at Helper, Utah was called to relieve another employee who was working overtime. Roberts was instructed
to report at ~S:oldier Summit, Utah, as soon as possible.
While enroute from Helper to Soldier Summit, he met
with an automobile accident which proved fatal. The
Industrial Commission denied compensation on the
ground that the deceased was not killed as a result of injuries arising out of or in the course of his employment. The order was affirmed hy the Supreme Court,
which held that deceas,ed was not, at the time of his injury, upon a special service or errand for his employer.
See also Greer v. Ind. Comm., 74 Ut. 379, 279 Pac.

900.
The attention of the court is also invited to Vitagraph Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 96 U t. 190, 85 Pac. ( 2d) 601,
which though somewhat different on the facts, contains
an excellent discussion of the whole question here involved.
In view of the fact that the applicants have taken
great p-ains to attempt to prove that Wilson gave Barney
instructions to bring the car from Magna to Salt. Lake
and did not give him any instructions to make repairs,
we anticipiate that defendants may make some contention in regard to this. We noted, in our statement of
facts that we regarded this conflict in the evidence as
immaterial. Whether Barney was instructed to go out
to Magna to effect repairs on a car, or whether he was
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to get a car there and deliver it to Salt Lake, it seems
obvious that his service to his employer could not commence, and he could not begin to perform either duty
until he got to the place where the car was. We do not
see any real distinction in the two situations. However, as
we mentioned in our Statement of Facts, if the Court is
of the opinion that it makes a substantial difference as
to what instructions Barney received from Wilson, we
think that the only reasonabJe inference from the evidence is that it was implicit if not ·explicit in those instructions that Barney should eomplete any necessary
repairs before bringing the automobile to ~Salt Lake.
CONCLUiSI,O·N
The fundamental principles upon which the whole
basis of Worlanen's compensation legislation rests, and
the previously established rules laid down in the adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction require that the order
of. the commission be set aside. To permit this award to
stand would he to open wide the gates to a flood of claims
never intended by the legislature to come within the provisions of the Act, and would throw upon the employer
the unconscionable burden of the financial responsibility
for activities of his employees, wholly beyond his control, and his ability to guard against. It would require
an abandonment of the rules and princip~les now so well
established. It is respectfully submitted that the order of
the Commission must be set aside.
ART·HUR E. MORET·O·N,
Attorneys for Pbamtiff
ELlA'S L. DAY,
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